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PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

Presidential Impunity and the Mueller Report:
How the Department of Justice’s Failure to
Subject the Special Counsel Regulations to
Notice and Comment Undermined the Rule of
Law
by M. AKRAM FAIZER1
Abstract:
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Special Counsel, Robert S. Mueller,
III’s two-volume, 448-page Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (“the Report”), did an outstanding
job in evidencing that President Trump’s actions in office satisfied the federal obstruction of justice standards. However, due to Mueller’s limited brief
and his concern for maintaining the proper separation of powers, the Report,
submitted confidentially to former Attorney General Barr as required by Department of Justice Regulations, abjured a determination as to Presidential
criminality. This regulatory confidentiality requirement in conjunction with
the requirement that Barr disclose an unverifiable Report summary to Congress, entitled the former Attorney General to mischaracterize the then-confidential report as an effective exoneration of the President, when the full
Report actually reads like a depressing Mafia boss indictment. By the time
Barr released the Report almost a full month later, the damage was done.
The former President and his supporters by then had succeeded in manipulating the political culture to accept Barr’s dishonest mischaracterization of
the Report and stymie its use to commence either an impeachment proceeding or force the President to put a stop to Russian election interference.
Barr’s success in marginalizing the Report tragically facilitated
Presidential impunity by encouraging the President’s worst instincts as manifested by his abuse of power in the Ukraine matter and his Administration’s
dishonest, bungling and divisive response to both the COVID-19 pandemic
1. Professor of Law, LMU Duncan School of Law. Professor Faizer would like to thank his
wife, Melanie Faizer, for her loving support throughout. He would also like to thank the members
of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for preparing this piece for publication.
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and the civil rights protests that followed George Floyd’s killing. Indeed,
although the President was subsequently impeached and tried by the full U.S.
Senate twice for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress with respect to
U.S. relations with the Government of Ukraine and for inciting an insurrection by his supporters to prevent Congress from certifying the 2020 Presidential election results in favor of his opponent, current President Joseph
Biden, the ostensible “Russia Hoax” and “witch hunt” against the President
was cited by the President and his supporters to delegitimize the impeachment proceedings and facilitate the President’s partisan acquittals by the
Senate.
Although presidential impunity has been facilitated by political polarization and partisan media, it is also, in this instance, attributable to infirmities in the Department of Justice Special Counsel regulations (“Special
Counsel Regulations”) that would have been ferreted out had they been
timely submitted for notice and comment feedback when first implemented
by former Attorney General Reno in 1999. This is because the Special Counsel Regulations, as written, never contemplated an unprincipled and partisaninclined Attorney General who would undermine the Report to further Presidential impunity.
I recommend submitting the Special Counsel Regulations for notice
and comment review under The Administrative Procedure Act Section 553
to solicit feedback from civil society as to how they can be improved consistent with the President’s powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.
At a minimum, I would expect that the received public comment will recommend future Attorneys General be disallowed from disclosing synopses or
summaries of Special Counsel reports without simultaneously disclosing the
entire redacted document. If this requirement had been in place at the time
when the Report was first submitted to Barr, the political culture would have
reacted far more forcefully against presidential abuse of power and obstruction of justice. Most likely, former President Trump would either have been
removed from office or chastened by a near conviction in the Senate after
impeachment in the House. Certainly, the country would not be facing the
current struggle of maintaining national cohesion after an unprecedented second impeachment of a president, after former President Trump, egregiously
and systematically abused his power to undermine public confidence in the
2020 presidential election, and, after losing the election to President Biden,
both refused to concede the election, and incited a mob of his supporters to
invade the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, which temporarily prevented
Congress from certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election.
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Introduction
In June 2020, the highly regarded New York Times columnist and
public intellectual David Brooks wrote that America was facing five simultaneous crises: 1) the losing fight against the Covid-19 pandemic; 2) the rapid
opinion shift surrounding race relations and racial inequality; 3) major political realignment brought about by the public’s apparent rejection of President Trump’s Republican Party; 4) the quasi-religion of Social Justice, which
is seeking to control the nation’s cultural institutions; and 5) an economic
depression.2 Although all five of these epic crises are attributable to broad
social forces, including the spread of communicable disease in the era of
globalization, it cannot be disputed that they were worsened by former President Trump’s reflexive authoritarianism, contempt for the rule of law and
overall unfitness for office. Needless to say, these factors help explain why
Trump narrowly lost the 2020 presidential election to his opponent, Joe
Biden, notwithstanding his parlous disregard for the country’s democratic
norms and the rule of law. Indeed, the problems related to the five simultaneous crises are so pronounced that it is easy to forget that in early 2020,
President Trump looked like a formidable candidate for reelection after he
was first acquitted by the Senate on impeachment charges for abuse of power
and obstruction of Congress based on the President’s improper and politically-motivated threat to withhold Congressionally appropriated military assistance from Ukraine.3 The first Senate acquittal was nominally unrelated
to the Report,4 which was delivered to former United States Attorney General William Barr on March 22, 2019, and demonstrated that the Russian
Federation interfered in the 2016 Presidential Election in favor of then-candidate Trump and detailed numerous instances where former President
Trump sought to obstruct and hinder the Special Counsel’s investigation.5
The Report now seems, to paraphrase the British aphorism, like ancient history. It should not. Rather, due to Barr’s mischaracterization of the Report’s
key findings and conclusions, it failed to elicit the appropriate political response, either from Congress or the broader political culture, which emboldened former President Trump to further abuse his powers and enabled Trump
2. David Brooks, America is Facing 5 Epic Crises All at Once, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/us-coronavirus-protests.html.
3. Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachmentvote.html.
4. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, Volumes 1 and 2 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [hereinafter THE REPORT].
5. Id.
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and his partisans to mischaracterize both the Special Counsel’s investigation
into the extent of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and
the facts surrounding the two subsequent impeachment proceedings brought
against him as partisan-driven “witch hunts.” It also furthered the former
President’s reflexive authoritarianism to undermine effective preparedness
and response to what Brooks describes as the five simultaneous crises. In
short, the Report’s ultimate failure to hold the former President accountable
for his criminal actions not only undermined the rule of law but furthered the
Trump’s sense of impunity, which, when conjoined with his reflexive authoritarianism, worsened the current crises facing American government and
society.
Why did the Report fall as flat as it did when the evidence of presidential criminality was so strong? One answer is that the Report’s failure to
elicit the level of indignation commensurate with the President’s crimes is
partly attributable to the political polarization and ratings-driven partisan
media entities that reflexively defend the former President. However, presidential impunity has, in this instance, also been furthered by infirmities in
the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations (“Special Counsel Regulations”) that
effectively enabled Barr to gutter the Report.6 This is because, per the Special Counsel Regulations, the Report had to be submitted confidentially to
Barr, who was entitled to publicly discuss the Report and submit an unverifiable Report synopsis to Congress and the public without any obligation to
publicly disclose the full Report.7 It also denied Mueller or members of his
team the ability to publicly dispute the former Attorney General’s public
mischaracterizations of the Report.8 In a March 24, 2019 letter to the leadership of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees (“March 24 Letter”),
Barr’s mischaracterized the Report as failing to find evidence of presidential
criminality.9 This enabled the Trump and his supporters, in the month-long
timeframe between the Report’s submission to Barr and its eventual disclosure to the public, to claim that the Report exonerated Trump and his White
House from allegations of criminal wrongdoing related to the Russia
6. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (1999) provides that the Special Counsel’s report is to be confidentially
provided to the Attorney General without any limitation as to how the Attorney General can use or
characterize such report.
7. 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (1999).
8. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8. Section C entitled Attorney General Barr to submit an unrebutted and
publicly available four-page summary of the Report to the Chair and Ranking Members of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees, that definitively mischaracterized the Report’s conclusions in President Trump’s favor.
9. Letter from William Barr to Lindsey Graham, Jerrold Nadler, Dianne Feinstein and Doug
Collins (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1153021/download [hereinafter
March 24 Letter].
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Investigation. This was followed by a subsequent letter, dated April 18,
2019, which anticipated the next day’s release of the fully redacted Report
by ostensibly summarizing the Report’s the conclusions in a manner consistent with the March 24 Letter.10
When Barr finally released the fully redacted Report on April 19,
2019, the damage was done. Because neither Mueller nor members of his
team could challenge Barr’s characterization of the Report in the interim,
Barr’s written mischaracterizations, in conjunction with public statements he
made regarding the Report’s conclusions, took hold of the political culture
and facilitated a supposition that former President Trump’s misdeeds, although depressingly laid out in the Report, neither constituted abuse of
power, nor merited an impeachment inquiry by the House of Representatives.
I. Informal Notice and Comment Rulemaking under Administrative
Law
The Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) most important “innovation was establishing a procedure for rulemaking,” which typically does
not require a hearing on the record and instead is subject to the notice and
comment procedure set out in Title Five of the Unites States Federal Code
Section 553.11 This consists of:
1. General notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register, specifying the time and place of the rulemaking proceedings, the legal authority relied on for their
issuance, and the content or subject matter of the proposed rule;
2. Opportunity for interested persons to submit written
comments on the proposed rule, and, at the agency’s
option, opportunity for oral presentations;
3. Agency consideration of the comments;
4. Issuance, when the final rule is promulgated, of a concise statement of its basis and purpose;
5. Publication of the final rule in the Federal Register;

10. Letter from William Barr to Lindsey Graham, Jerrold Nadler, Dianne Feinstein and Doug
Collins (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/page/file/1167086/download [hereinafter April 18 Letter].
11. STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, 519 (7th
ed. 2011).
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6. In the case of substantive rules that impose new requirements, delay of the rule’s effective date for at least
thirty days after publication.12
The purpose of the procedure is to enlighten decisionmakers by exposing them to the viewpoints of interested persons and allow those persons
to have a say in the final rules.13 It, furthermore, improves the quality of
rulemaking by helping agencies anticipate what former Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has called the “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” to improve upon the previously issued tentative rules.14 Indeed, in
recent years, notice-and-comment rulemaking has been transformed, especially as regards controversial proposals, into “a rather elaborate paper hearing procedure that generates a full documentary record and an elaborate
agency option that attempts to justify the agency rule and respond to evidentiary, analytical, and policy criticisms of the rule and its supporting material.”15 United States v. Nova Scotia Products Corp16 is paradigmatic.
Nova Scotia involved the Food and Drug Administration’s conduct of 553
notice-and-comment rulemaking for purposes of issuing safety regulations
for the smoking of fish to safeguard against botulism poisoning.17 The FDA
sued to enjoin Nova Scotia Food Products Corp. and its officers from processing hot-smoked whitefish in violation of the regulations.18 After the district court granted the injunction, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the FDA’s rule promulgation was based on
inadequate procedures because FDA failed to disclose the scientific data and
the methodology upon which it relied and because “it failed utterly to address
itself to the question of commercial feasibility,” i.e. it never addressed the
interposed comment that applying the proposed regulations to whitefish
would destroy the commercial product.19 In particular, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the failure to notify interested persons “of the scientific research upon which the agency was relying actually prevented the presentation of relevant comment, means the agency failed to consider all the relevant
factors” because to “suppress meaningful comment by failure to disclose the
12. Id. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (West 2016).
13. BREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 519.
14. Id. at 519. Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was famously quoted as saying “[a]s we
know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
15. Id. at 552.
16. 568 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir. 1977).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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basic data relied upon is akin to rejecting comment altogether” and leads to
arbitrary decision-making.20 Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,21
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals set aside a Securities and Exchange Commission rule because the agency never publicly disclosed, during notice-and-comment, that it had relied on extra-record studies that were
the essential foundation for the SEC’s basic assumptions in making its analysis.22
The purpose behind notice-and-comment is to aid the agency in arriving at and enlightened policy choice. Department of Homeland Security
v. Regents of the University of California,23 points to the importance of administrative proceduralism and the effectuation of “hard look” review to insulate the professional civil service from illegitimate political pressure. In
DHS, the Court invalidated the Trump Administration’s rescission of the
Obama Administration-implemented Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program on the grounds it failed to satisfy “hard look” review, notwithstanding a change in Presidential Administration, because 1)
the agency’s purported reasons for the rescission consisted primarily of “post
hoc” rationalizations that undermine agency accountability; 2) DHS treated
the former Attorney General Sessions’ illegality conclusion regarding
DACA’s provision of lawful presence benefits to unauthorized migrants as
sufficient to rescind both benefits and forbearance of deportation, without
explaining why it failed to consider only forbearance as an alternative policy;
and 3) DHS arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider legitimate reliance
interests on the original DACA Memorandum by failing to weigh them
against competing policy concerns.24
There are, however, broad exceptions to APA mandated notice-andcomment rulemaking. Under Section 553(a), military and foreign affairs
functions and rules relating to “agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts” are exempted from the section’s requirements.25 Moreover, the requirements of notice in the Federal
Register and opportunity for comment do not apply “to interpretive rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice,” or when the agency for “good cause” finds the notice and comment
procedure is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public

20.
21.
22.
23.
(2020).
24.
25.

Id.
443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d 890.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1891
Id.
BREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 520.

PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

Summer 2021

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

543

interest.”26 Recognizing that time and resources can be saved in bypassing
notice and comment, doing so precludes an agency from improving upon the
tentative rules through public comment by exposing the agency to, perhaps,
unanticipated counterfactuals and contingencies.27 This is tragically what
happened with the Special Counsel Regulations when former Attorney General Reno bypassed notice-and-comment and instead issued them as direct
final rules in 1999.28
II. The DOJ Special Counsel Regulations
The Special Counsel Regulations were issued as direct final rules,
exempt from the APA’s typical notice and comment requirements, when
they were promulgated in 1999.29 Four reasons were given for the exemptions:
First, ‘this [r]ule relates to agency management or personnel, and is therefore exempt from the usual requirements of
prior notice and comment and a 30-day delay in the effective
date.’ Second, ‘this rule would be exempted from the requirements of notice and comment as a rule of agency organization, procedure, practice.’ Third, ‘the effective date
of the rule need not be delayed for 30 days after publication
because the rule is not a ‘substantive rule.’’ The fourth reason is potentially the most important . . . ‘because the provisions of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1994 expire on June 30, 1999, the Attorney General has
26. Id.
27. Professor Sidney Shapiro has estimated that the comment period only takes a minimum
of three months and there is a typical four to eight-year timeframe to implement important rules
using notice and comment. See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE, 137 (5th ed. 2014).
28. The DOJ issued the Special Counsel Regulations as direct final rules based on section 553
(b)(3)(A) and (b)(3)(B), which provides that notice and comment can be avoided when deemed
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” by the agency. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7.
See also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (finding that the APA requires that prior to implementation of a final rule that has force of law, the agency must publish a
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register under Section 553 (b) that gives interested
parties an opportunity to submit data, views or arguments regarding the proposed rule that must be
considered and given a “hard look” by the agency prior to issuing final rules that have the force of
law.)
29. See Josh Blackman, Can the Special Counsel Regulations Be Unilaterally Revoked?,
LAWFARE (July 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-special-counsel-regulations-be-unilaterally-revoked.
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determined that it is imperative to have these rules governing the appointment and service of a Special Counsel in
place as soon as possible.’”30
Accordingly, even if the rule were not exempt from the usual requirements
of prior notice and comment and a thirty-day delay in the effective date, there
would be “good cause” for issuing this rule without prior notice and comment and without a thirty-day delay in the effective date.31
The Special Counsel Regulations allow the Attorney General to appoint a Special Counsel “where he or she determines that criminal investigation of a person or matter is warranted, that investigation or prosecution of
that person by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or litigating division of the Department of Justice would present a conflict of interest for the Department or
other extraordinary circumstances”32 and that “it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the
matter.”33 The Special Counsel is to be cloaked with all the powers of “any
United States Attorney”34 and the Special Counsel can be disciplined or removed from office “only by personal action by the Attorney General,” who
may remove a Special Counsel for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of
Departmental policies.”35 The Special Counsel Regulations further provide
that the Special Counsel’s final report is to be submitted confidentially to the
Attorney General, explaining the final prosecution or declination decision,36
and the Attorney General has sole discretion to determine whether the final
report is to be publicly released.37 The regulation then provides that the Attorney General shall issue a notification and report to the Chairman and
Ranking Members of the Judiciary Committees of each house of congress,
upon appointing a Special Counsel, upon removing a Special Counsel, and,
most importantly for purposes of this article, upon conclusion of the Special
Counsel’s investigation.38 Moreover, the regulations leave to the Attorney
General the power to determine whether to release to Congress or the public
all or parts of a Special Counsel’s fiscal, annual or final reports.39

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.
See Blackman, supra note 29.
28 C.F.R. § 600.1.
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 600.6.
28 C.F.R. § 600.7 (d).
28 C.F.R. § 600.8.
28 C.F.R § 600.9.
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (c).
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The Special Counsel Regulations have proven ineffective at protecting against Executive Branch corruption in the Trump Administration. This
is for several reasons. First, they never anticipated the growth of profitdriven partisan media to protect the Administration from accountability.
This is attributable to technology and broader cultural phenomena that are
beyond this paper’s scope. Second, the Special Counsel Regulations never
anticipated a partisan Attorney General publicly mischaracterizing a Special
Counsel report as has been the case with Attorney General Barr and the Report. A remedy is needed. My recommendation, in view of these infirmities
and abuses, is to subject the Special Counsel Regulations to a new round of
notice and comment feedback under Section 553, anticipating expert feedback on means of assuring executive branch accountability in a polarized
political environment.40
This is because the APA requires agencies to incorporate feedback
received as to the tentative rules from the public, regulated entities, legal
experts and civil society, to assist it in arriving at better regulations to effectuate the goals behind the rulemaking. In other words, it helps the agency
arrive at better rules by enabling it to incorporate concerns that were not addressed in the tentative rulemaking.41 Indeed, bypassing notice and comment
as the DOJ did when promulgating the Special Counsel Regulations, may
seem logical from an expediency perspective, but is not the best way to
evolve public law and policy.42 Ideally, the comments received would educate the DOJ as to means of improving Special Counsel Regulations in view
of recent history consistent with separation of powers concerns. They would
most likely recommend amended rules that, at the very least, preclude the
Attorney General from issuing any report summary to Congress without contemporaneously releasing a full report to both Congress and the public.43
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
41. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985) (where the
court remanded to the agency to resubmit tentative rules when the initial tentative rules had adequately advised the flavored milk industry that its interests could be affected by tentative rules
designed to improve nutrition in the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and
Children; see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that interim final rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had
to be vacated for failure to subject the rulemaking to notice and comment because EPA could not
show that use of notice and comment was contrary to the public interest); but see U.S. v. Dean, 604
F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Attorney General’s invocation of a good cause
exception to the usual notice and comment requirement for implementation of retroactive rules
applicable to all sex offenders convicted prior to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, was merited to withstand judicial review).
42. U.S. v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 929–31 (5th Cir. 2011).
43. After making appropriate redactions to protect existing court proceedings and future prosecutions.
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Although this change would not be a panacea in that ideologically driven
media will still seek to distort any report conclusions, it will, at least, protect
a Special Counsel Report’s integrity from a dispositive mischaracterization
by a partisan Attorney General keen on protecting the president at whose
pleasure he serves. Although it might seem counterintuitive for an Administration to, in effect, weaken its executive power over criminal investigations by enacting such a regulatory amendment via notice and comment, it
would, over time, enhance the power and prestige of the presidency by encouraging trust in government in a country where cynicism and misanthropy
undermines national cohesion.44 After all, former President Trump, while
apparently immune from accountability for presidential abuse of power, remained a very weak president during his term of office, notwithstanding full
employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and, a relatively robust domestic economy during his presidential term of office.45 If my proposal were
to have been implemented in the almost eighteen years between the Special
Counsel Regulations’ initial implementation and the appointment of Special
Counsel Mueller, the end result might have been a more effective response
to both Russian election interference and presidential abuse of power and
obstruction of justice. It might also have fortuitously strengthened the hand
of republican senators such as Mitt Romney who, as a matter of principal,
object to presidential abuse of power.46 At the very least, a properly chastened President Trump might never have dared abuse his power to coerce
Ukraine’s President into investigating a political rival for partisan advantage,
nor feel emboldened to undermine public confidence in both the 2020 election and the 2020 presidential election result. I now turn to the subject of
how the U.S. Constitution protects against Presidential impunity.
III. Holding a President to Account: The President’s Powers
under Article II and the Congress’s Sole Remedy of Impeachment and
Conviction
The U.S. Constitution provides that “the executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States”47 who “shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed…”48 Because presidents are in charge of the
44. See Janan Ganesh, Public Cynicism is Destroying American Politics, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cf8d0622-f56c-11e9-b018-3ef8794b17c6.
45. James Carville, Hey Democrats, It’s the Winning, Stupid!, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/aa0677e0-48fe-11ea-aee2-9ddbdc86190d.
46. See Anne Applebaum, History Will Judge the Complicit, THE ATLANTIC, (July/Aug.
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/trumps-collaborators/612250/.
47. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
48. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Executive Branch, which, in turn, is responsible for prosecuting all federal
crimes, the problem of presidential or Executive Branch corruption becomes
manifest. Thankfully, the U.S. has been spared an excess of presidential or
Executive Branch corruption such that the matter of investigating presidential corruption has not been paradigmatic.49
One obvious remedy for presidential corruption, when it has arisen,
is impeachment by the House of Representatives followed by conviction by
the U.S. Senate after a trial presided over by the Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court.50 There has been a paucity of Presidential impeachments
with only three Presidents, including President Trump, being impeached by
the full House of Representatives and none being convicted after a full trial
before the U.S. Senate.51 This small number of successful impeachments is
possibly explained by an enlightened awareness by legislators, over time,
that impeaching a sitting president can problematically undermine national
cohesion.52 It is also possible that our Framers, in requiring a two-thirds
supermajority to convict in the U.S. Senate, inadvertently set the threshold
for presidential conviction and removal too high, especially in a polarized
political environment.53
Impeachment has been mischaracterized as requiring presidential
criminality in office when the Framers saw it as a remedy to the broader
problem of presidential unfitness.54 Moreover, President Trump and previous presidents threatened with impeachment improperly claimed it will reverse an election outcome when, as a result of the Twelfth Amendment, the
duly elected Vice-President, in the case of President Trump, Mike Pence,
would have assumed office should the President have been convicted by the
Senate.55
49. I say this recognizing that there are undoubtedly many examples of corruption that have
not been disclosed and have therefore been kept secret. My point is merely that the United States
has had lower levels of Executive Branch corruption than other major countries.
50. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, art. I, § 3 cl. 6 and 7 and art. II, § 4.
51. Both Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were impeached and acquitted by the
U.S. Senate and President Nixon resigned from office before the full House of Representatives
could vote on the House Judiciary Committee’s Articles of Impeachment.
52. See Ronald Dworkin, A Kind of Coup, New York Review of Books (July 14, 1999); see
also Cass. R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 Penn. L. Rev. 279 (1998).
53. See GENE HEALY, INDISPENSABLE REMEDY, THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE
CONSTITUTION’S IMPEACHMENT POWER (Cato Institute 2018), https://www.cato.org/white-paper/indispensable-remedy-broad-scope-constitutions-impeachment-power (arguing that the Framers settled on the two-thirds conviction requirement at the very end of discussions on the matter
and most likely did not anticipate that it was setting too high a threshold for Presidential removal).
54. Id.
55. Id. The Twelfth Amendment, which was enacted and ratified to remedy problems that
arose after the 1800 Presidential Election, provides that the Electors are to vote for President and
Vice-President separately such that the successor to a president who is assassinated, dies in office,

PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

548

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:4

Because a president is in charge of the Executive Department with
sole responsibility to take care that the laws be “faithfully executed,” such
that his nominated Attorney General is responsible for the Justice Department’s prosecution and declination decisions, investigation of presidential
criminality becomes problematic.56 This unitary approach to executive
branch power explains the textual legality of the “Saturday Night Massacre,”
when President Nixon, seeking to avoid disclosure of the Watergate tapes to
the then Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, accepted the resignation of his Attorney General, Elliott Richardson, when Richardson refused
to fire Cox, and then fired Richardson’s deputy, William Ruckleshaus, after
Ruckleshaus also refused to fire Cox.57 What is often forgotten about this
episode is that when Nixon nominated Richardson to be his Attorney General
in the midst of the Watergate imbroglio, Richardson promised Democrats on
the Senate Judiciary to select and protect a special prosecutor as a condition
of confirmation.58 According to Blackmun, Richardson did not resign because he thought discharging Cox would be illegal, notwithstanding the regulations that limited grounds for his removal to “extraordinary improprieties.”59 Rather, as evidenced by a letter Richardson contemporaneously
wrote to President Nixon, he felt obliged to resign rather than fire Cox based
on the personal commitment he made to the Senate Judiciary Committee to
not interfere with the Special Prosecutor’s Counsel’s independence.60 This
same commitment to the Senate Judiciary Committee explains why Ruckleshaus also refused to fire Cox.61

resigns from office or is, perhaps in the future, convicted in the Senate, will take office consistent
with the prior general election’s result.
56. HEALY, supra note 53. Because the Attorney General is a cabinet member removable at
the President’s will, Justice Department Special Prosecutors cannot be provided constitutional protection when investigating alleged Executive Branch malfeasance. Id.
57. Cox, who was appointed by Richardson in conjunction with 38 C.F.R. 14688-01, which
established the Watergate Prosecution Force, provided that “[t]he Special Prosecutor will not be
removed from his duties except for extraordinary improprieties on his part.” Cox was eventually
fired by then Solicitor General Robert Bork after both Richardson and Ruckleshaus resigned their
office as Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, respectively.
58. Josh Blackmun, Could Trump Remove Special Counsel Mueller? Lessons from Watergate, LAWFARE (May 23, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/could-trump-remove-specialcounsel-robert-mueller-lessons-watergate.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. According to a Washington Post article cited by Blackman, Ruckleshaus’s resignation
was refused, and he was fired by President Nixon for his failure to fire Cox. See Carroll Kipatrick,
Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardso Ruckleshaus Quit, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 1973),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.html.
The Post article posits that Nixon allowed Richardson to resign because he accepted Richardson’s
promise to the Senate as a valid reason for resignation but did not feel the same way about Ruckleshaus.
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Solicitor General Bork eventually carried out President Nixon’s order to fire Cox based on his understanding that the regulations in place cannot prevent a president from removing a lower-level executive officer, especially one who sought to publicly defy the President’s directive.62 Bork
testified during his confirmation hearings as President Reagan’s nominee to
be an associate Supreme Court Justice, that Richardson actually told him to
fire Cox because Bork was in a different moral position, never having given
Cox a Special Prosecutor’s charter and never having promised the Senate
that he would ensure the Special Prosecutor’s independence.63 Although, in
Nader v. Bork, Judge Gesell concluded that Cox’s firing was illegal because
it contravened the Justice Department regulation that corresponded with his
appointment, this decision was subsequently vacated by the D.C. Circuit
Court on October 22, 1975, well after the Watergate tapes were released,
President Nixon resigned the Presidency, and his successor, President Ford,
issued him a prospective pardon for all acts he committed as President.64
The legality of a presidential order to fire a lower-level Executive
Branch official notwithstanding regulations stating otherwise has not been
resolved. The orthodox view is that such a directive would be within a president’s authority, e.g. Bork felt obliged to fire Cox at Nixon’s behest because
control of the Justice Department is an inherent executive power under Article II. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson,65 wherein he characterizes both the appointment and removal provisions of the Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 as an unconstitutional
usurpation of the president’s powers under Article II, has succeeded in relegating Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Morrison to the ranks
of the Court’s jurisprudential anti-canon. In short, congressional and regulatory measures designed to protect an Independent or Special Counsel from
removal by their superiors are, most likely, violative of Article II’s Take Care
Clause.66
As such, DOJ investigations into Executive Branch lawlessness can
be scuppered without contemporaneous criminal consequence by a president
willing to pay the political price as President Nixon did when he ordered
Cox’s firing, and as President Trump was prepared to do when he, on several
occasions, sought to have Special Counsel Mueller removed or his authority
curtailed. Compounding the problem of impunity, an authoritative 1973
62. Blackmun, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Watergate “smoking gun” tape was released on August 5, 1974, Nixon resigned
from office on August 9, 1974 and President Ford pardoned Nixon on September 8, 1974.
65. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
66. Id.
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Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinion, adopted by Special Counsel
Mueller, concludes that a sitting President cannot be criminally prosecuted
while in office.67 This is because such a prosecution would violate the constitutional structure—in other words, a president, who is responsible for public prosecutions, cannot be a criminal defendant consistent with his Article
II obligations.68 This hornbook understanding of U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence means that the exclusive remedy against a lawless chief executive
is either impeachment and removal from office based on a Senate trial conviction or a delayed prosecution that would commence once the president’s
term of office expires.69 Furthermore, because the constitution affords a sitting president the ability to use Article II’s pardon power to pardon subordinates from future federal criminal liability, the sole remedy against a lawless president is congressional impeachment and conviction.70 This, in turn,
is problematic because congressional subpoenas are increasingly disregarded
by the White House on executive privilege grounds,71 and the sole means of
effectively investigating executive branch corruption is via the appointment
of a special counsel who can constitutionally be removed from office by the
Attorney General.
IV. The Lack of Constitutional Remedies to Presidential Lawlessness
and the Special Counsel Regulations
The Watergate-era evidenced the need to remedy Presidential lawlessness, especially when the House Judiciary and Senate Watergate Committees’ hearings into the matter were effectively marginalized as improperly
partisan until the very end.72 No impeached president has been convicted by
the Senate and, in the case of President Trump, the Senate went so far as to
reject the calling of any witnesses prior to acquittal.73 As we have seen, the
67. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C
222 (2000).
68. Id.
69. See THE REPORT, supra note 4 (which concluded that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted in office, although criminal prosecution can be commenced either upon completion of the
president’s term in office or subsequent to removal by conviction in the Senate). This is why President Ford pardoned former President Nixon after Nixon resigned the Presidency in August 1974.
See also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 69, 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2(2).
71. See, e.g., the White House’s refusal to comply with Congressional subpoenas during the
first Trump impeachment involving the Ukraine matter.
72. It was only because the White House tapes evidenced lawlessness at the highest levels
that support for the President within his own party collapsed and Nixon was forced to resign to
preempt conviction and removal by the Senate. Nixon, moreover, remains the only president forced
from office based on an impeachment investigation.
73. Baker, supra note 3.
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appointment of a Special Prosecutor is no panacea. Nor are legislative innovations to immunize prosecutors from executive branch oversight.
For example, a Democratic Congress enacted, and President Carter
signed into law the now expire Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (“Act”) to
prevent a repeat of the “Saturday Night Massacre” and institutionalize a
means of protecting against Presidential abuse of power.74 Under Title Five
of the Act, the “independent counsel” could investigate and, if appropriate,
prosecute high-ranking Government officials for violation of federal criminal laws.75 It required the Attorney General, upon receipt of information
deemed sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person
covered by the Act may have violated a federal criminal law, to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the matter.76 After the Attorney General either
completed this investigation, or ninety days elapsed, the Attorney General
was required to report to a special court (the Special Division), a three judge
panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, created by the
Act for the purpose of appointing independent counsels, such that if the AG
determined there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted, the Attorney General must so notify the Special Division.77 If, however, there were reasonable grounds to believe further investigation or prosecution was warranted, then the Attorney General must apply
for the appointment of an independent counsel under the Act (emphasis
added).78 Upon receiving this application, the Special Division appointed an
independent counsel with full power and independent authority to exercise
all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department
of Justice.79 The independent counsel could be removed from office only by
a) impeachment and conviction by Congress; or b) by personal action by the
Attorney General for “good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or
any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.”80
Although the Supreme Court, in Morrison, concluded that both the
appointment and removal provisions were consistent with the “Appointments” and “Take Care” clauses, Justice Scalia, in dissent, concluded the Act
was unconstitutional because the independent counsel, clothed with such
74. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, titles I–V, 92 Stat. 1824–1867
(1978) (current version 28 U.S.C. § 591).
75. Id.
76. See Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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immense prosecutorial power, is a high executive official who can only serve
at the president’s pleasure and therefore cannot be appointed by the judicial
branch.81 Recognizing Scalia’s perspective was then in the minority, his dissent has become canonical, especially since Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr’s lengthy investigation resulted in the highly unpopular impeachment
and subsequent acquittal of former President Clinton based on Clinton’s lies,
cover-up, and suborning of perjury related to an improper sexual affair he
had with a female White House intern.82 Consequently, both major political
parties consented to the Act’s expiration in 1999 based on the manifest evidence of prosecutorial overreach adumbrated in Scalia’s Morrison dissent.
As a result, the Justice Department under then-Attorney General Reno issued
the current Special Counsel Regulations as emergency regulations, without
notice and comment, to provide future attorneys general the ability to appoint
Special Counsel absent statutory authorization.83 It was under these Special
Counsel Regulations that Mueller was appointed by then-Acting Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein after the then-Attorney General, Jefferson Sessions
III, recused himself from the Justice Department’s Russia Investigation. It
is to the Report and its principal findings and conclusions that this paper now
turns.
V. The Report’s Key Findings of Fact
On May 17, 2017, “to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the
Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,”
especially after Trump fired then-FBI Director James Comey, the then-Acting Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, appointed Special Counsel Mueller
to investigate “any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald
Trump” as well as matters arising directly from the investigation and other
matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. 600.4 through 600.10, which, among
other things, covers efforts to interfere and obstruct the investigation.84 The
Report was delivered confidentially to Barr on March 22, 2019.85 It highlights numerous findings of fact as to Russian Government in the U.S.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (conceding that legislative limitations imposed on the removal of executive officials are constitutionally
problematic and invalidating the removal provision of the Sarbanes Oxley Act’s Public Company
Oversight Board).
83. 28 C.F.R. 600 et seq. (1999).
84. Id. at vol. 1, pp. 8, 11.
85. Sharon LaFraniere and Katie Benner, Mueller Delivers Report on Trump Russia Investigation to Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/us/politics/mueller-report.html.
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presidential election, contacts between Russian officials and the Trump
Campaign and subsequent presidential abuses of power.86
The Report divided the President’s actions into two phases.87 The
first involved the period up to Comey’s firing when the President had been
told repeatedly that he was not under investigation.88 The second phase involved the time period after the Special Counsel was appointed and the President learned he was personally being investigated in an obstruction-of-justice inquiry.89 In this phase, the President publicly attacked the investigation,
privately undertook efforts to control it, and publicly and privately encouraged witnesses not to cooperate.90 The Report evaluated the President’s motives using a totality of circumstances approach.91
After a detailed analysis demonstrating the Russian Federation intervened in the 2016 presidential election, the Report concluded that the evidence was insufficient to charge any Trump Campaign official as an unregistered Russian government agent or other Russian principal.92 The Report
further concluded that the evidence was insufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with Russian government officials to
interfere in the 2016 Presidential election.93 The Report wrote that there was
no proven coordination or conspiracy between the Russian government and
Trump Campaign to alter the election outcome, including with respect to
Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for favorable treatment in the future.94 That said, candidate Trump’s public statements and
those of his campaign aides would have made Russian assistance more
likely. These statements, at a minimum, conveyed to the Russians that their
interests would definitively be further under a Trump Administration.95 This
is because candidate Trump consistently spoke admiringly of President
Putin, Trump campaign members met on several occasions with Russian officials, evidencing a willingness to, at the very least, normalize relations between the two countries and welcome campaign assistance from Russianbacked entities.96 Mueller chose not to prosecute Trump officials with conspiracy because it could not establish that they were involved in a criminal
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See THE REPORT, supra note 4.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 7, 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at vol. 1, p. 9.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, p. 9.
Id. at p. 66.
Id. at p. 173.
Id.

PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

554

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:4

conspiracy, which, of course, is very difficult to prove. The Report makes
clear, however, that this does not absolve either the President or his Campaign from political accountability for soliciting and accepting assistance
from a hostile government.97
The President, however, reacted to news of Mueller’s appointment
as Special Counsel by telling advisors that it was “the end of his presidency”
and demanding that former Attorney General Sessions resign.98 Sessions
submitted his resignation by letter, which the President ultimately did not
accept.99 The President then directed former White House Counsel Donald
McGahn to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn did not carry out the order,
stating that he would rather resign than trigger what he considered to be another Saturday Night Massacre.100 By June 2017, Trump became aware of
emails setting up a June 9, 2016 meeting between senior Trump campaign
and Russian government officials who offered derogatory information on the
Clinton campaign as part of Russian government’s support for candidate
Trump.101 On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017, Trump
directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails and then he dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by his son, Donald Trump Jr., wrongly
describing the meeting as about adoptions from Russia.102 When the press
asked questions regarding former President Trump’s involvement in editing
his son’s statement, Trump’s personal lawyer lied by repeatedly denying the
President played any role in editing Don Jr.’s message.103
In early Summer 2017, the President called Sessions at his home and
once again asked him to reverse his recusal decision in the Russia investigation, which Sessions refused.104 In October 2017, Trump met with Sessions
at the Oval Office and asked him to take a look at investigating Hillary Clinton.105 In December 2017, the President met with Sessions at the Oval Office
after his former National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, plead guilty to a
felony conviction and advised Sessions that he would be a “hero” if he unrecused and took back control of the Russia election interference investigation.106 The President also repeatedly claimed the Special Counsel had a
conflict of interest that merited his being removed from the Russia

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, p. 175.
Id. at vol. 2, p. 4.
Id.
Id. at p. 4, 88.
Id. at p. 4, 98.
Id.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 5.
Id.
Id. at p. 5.
Id.
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investigation.107 This claim by the President and his personal lawyer was
rejected as incorrect not only by McGahn, but by the Acting Attorney General for the Russia Investigation, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.108
In early 2018, it was reported that the President, in June 2017, ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed and that McGahn responded by saying he would rather resign than carry out the order.109
McGahn was then pressured by Trump to deny to officials that he had been
instructed to fire Mueller and was questioned by Trump as to why he advised
the Special Counsel as such and took notes of their meetings.110 McGahn
felt Trump was testing his mettle and was prepared to resign over what he
perceived to be an improper directive by the President to fire the Special
Counsel and do “other crazy shit” at the President’s behest. McGahn, who
communicated this to his own personal lawyer, was dissuaded from resigning by both his then White House Chief of Staff, Reince Priebus and his then
White House Chief of Staff, Steve Bannon.111
The Special Counsel concluded that the President’s subsequent
claims that he did not direct McGahn to fire the Special Counsel were untrue
based on McGahn’s credibility and lack of motivation to lie, his clear recollection of events, and his preparation to resign over the President’s request
to improperly convey information to Rosenstein.112
The Report concluded that substantial evidence demonstrates the
President’s repeated attempts to remove the Special Counsel were based on
the Special Counsel’s oversight investigations that involved the President’s
conduct and to reports that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for potential obstruction of justice.113 The Report further concluded that
the President knew that he was acting improperly by ordering McGahn to
fire the Special Counsel.114 The Report also stated that the reason the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse was to have him take back control of the
Russia investigation and protect himself from the Special Counsel’s investigation.115
The day after the 2018 mid-term elections, when it was clear that the
Republican Party had increased its majority in the U.S. Senate, Trump fired
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at pp. 82–3.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 82–3.
Id. at p. 6.
Id.
Id. at p. 87.
Id. at p. 88.
Id. at p. 89.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 90.
Id. at p. 113
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Sessions and replaced him with Sessions’ Chief of Staff as Acting Attorney
General.116 After the New York Times reported that Trump had ordered
McGahn to fire the Special Counsel, Trump ordered McGahn to publicly
deny the report. McGahn, who refused to do so, was rebuked by Trump for
taking notes of his meetings with the former President and telling the Special
Counsel that Trump ordered him to fire the Special Counsel.117
Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort was hired by Trump
without pay after being recommended by Trump associates Thomas Barrack
and Roger Stone.118 Though unpaid, Manafort’s position would increase the
likelihood he would paid for past work in the amount of $2 million by Russian Oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and result in Deripaska dropping a lawsuit
against him.119 Manafort’s plan was also to monetize his relationship with
Trump by acting as a compensated go-between while remaining outside the
Administration should Trump win the presidency.120 Manafort had connections to Russia through Deripaska and later through his work for former President Yanukovych’s pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.121 He stayed in touch
with these contacts during the campaign through Konstantin Kilimnik, a
longtime Manafort aide, who previously ran Manafort’s Kiev office and who
the FBI assesses as having ties to Russian intelligence.122 Indeed, Manafort
instructed his deputy, Rick Gates, to share internal polling data with
Kilimnik during the campaign. Manafort also corresponded via Kilimnik
with former Ukrainian President Yanukovych regarding a Ukrainian Peace
Plan that would require U.S. support to succeed. The Special Prosecutor’s
office was unable to confirm that this information was shared with Trump
and Manafort was forced to resign his position from the Trump Campaign in
August 2016 due to media reports of his consulting work for the pro-Russian
Party of Regions in Ukraine.123
During Manafort’s subsequent prosecution for lying to federal prosecutors, when the jury was deliberating, Trump made public comments supportive of Manafort and, after his conviction, said that Manafort was right
not to cooperate with prosecutors, that “flipping” ought to outlawed and
made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon.124 The Report concluded that the President’s conduct toward Flynn and Manafort qualify as
obstructive and would typically support obstruction of justice charges as they
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at p. 110.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 113, 117.
Id. at vol. 1, p. 134.
Id.
Id. at p. 135.
Id. at p. 129.
Id.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, pp. 129, 141, 144.
Id. at vol. 2, p. 6.
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were both witnesses in the Special Counsel’s investigation, and the President’s conduct was intended to prevent both men from testifying truthfully,
or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.125
The President’s conduct involving his personal lawyer, Michael Cohen, changed from praise for Cohen when Cohen falsely minimized Trump’s
involvement in the Trump Moscow real estate development project, to castigation when Cohen became a cooperating witness.126 From September
2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the project on the Trump Organization’s behalf and briefed candidate Trump on it numerous times, including
whether the candidate should travel to Russia to advance the deal.127 In 2017,
Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including stating that he only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a “party line” that sought
to minimize the President’s connections to Russia.128 After FBI investigators
raided Cohen’s home and office in April 2018, Trump publicly asserted that
Cohen would not flip and told Cohen to not cooperate with prosecutors and
to “stay strong” and privately passed messages of support to him.129 Cohen
said that he had discussions with Trump’s personal counsel and believed that
if he stayed on message he would be “taken care of.”130 However, after Cohen began cooperating with the government in the summer of 2018, the President referred to him as a “weak person,” publicly criticized him, calling him
a “rat,” suggested his family had committed crimes and that he should serve
prison time.131
The Report concluded that Trump’s actions regarding Cohen can
constitute obstruction of justice as the then-President was aware of Cohen’s
false testimony to Congress, that he was, after Cohen’s guilty plea, concerned about what Cohen would tell investigators regarding the Trump
Tower Moscow project, and therefore sought to deter Cohen from cooperating with prosecutors.132
VI. The Report’s Key Conclusions of Law

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 131.
Id. at p. 6.
Id. at p. 134.
Id.
Id. at pp. 6, 134.
Id.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 134, 149, 150, 151.
Id. at vol. 2, pp. 155–56.
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The Report states that former President Trump, as head of the Executive Branch, had means of affecting the Russia investigation that are relevant to an obstruction of justice charge beyond the purview of a typical obstruction of justice case because some of his actions, including the firing of
former FBI Director Comey, “are facially lawful acts within his Article II
authority.”133 However, the Trump’s position as head of the Executive
Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official
proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses, which is “relevant
to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis.”134 Second, the lack of proof
of an underlying conspiracy crime committed by Trump related to Russian
election interference also affects the analysis by requiring consideration of
the possible motives of his conduct.135 The fact that many of the former
President’s acts directed at witnesses, including discouraging their cooperation with prosecutors and suggesting possible future pardons, took place in
public does not, according to the Report, immunize them from the reach of
obstruction laws, i.e. the analysis is the same as for private acts because the
likely effect of the former President’s conduct was to influence witnesses or
alter their testimony to the detriment of the justice system’s integrity.136
The Report rejected the President’s personal counsel’s claim that the
obstruction of justice statutes do not cover the President’s actions because
this is neither the position of the DOJ, nor is it supported by principles of
statutory construction.137 To illustrate, the federal obstruction of justice statute, in relevant part, prohibits all persons from corruptly obstructing, influencing or impeding any official proceeding, or attempting to do so.138 The
Report highlighted that the statute applies to all corrupt means of obstructing
a proceeding, pending or contemplated, “including by improper exercises of
official power.”139 Furthermore, the Report set forth that the statute covers
a wide array of obstructive conduct, including the improper use of government processes, (see e.g., the Watergate cover-up perpetrated by White
House officials and President Nixon).140 It also applies to those improperly
seeking to subvert, impede or obstruct a relevant judicial proceeding.141 The
Report concluded that the President’s claim that his conduct falls outside the
scope of obstruction laws “lacks merit”142 such that the President lacked a
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 6, 156.
Id. at pp. 6, 157.
Id.
Id. at pp. 7, 157.
Id. at pp. 7, 159.
Id. at vol. 2, pp. 7, 160; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 7, 160.
Id. at pp. 7, 165.
Id. at pp. 7, 166.
Id. at pp. 7, 168.
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legitimate statutory defense to a potential criminal obstruction of justice
charge.143
With respect to Constitutional defenses, the Report concluded that
the President is subject to the same obstruction of justice statutes as a private
citizen when his conduct does not implicate presidential constitutional authority.144 With respect to whether a president can obstruct justice by exercising his Article II powers, the Report concluded “that Congress has authority to prohibit a president’s corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the
administration of justice.”145 This “accords with our constitutional system
of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.”146
The Report concluded that the President’s claim that his conduct falls outside
the scope of obstruction laws “lacks merit.”147
Although the president has constitutional power “to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed” and direct criminal investigations, as well as
the power to appoint and remove all officers of the United States, the Report
concluded that this does not provide a constitutional defense to an obstruction charge because when the President’s official actions come into conflict
with prohibitions in the obstruction statutes because “any constitutional tension is reconciled through separation of powers analysis.”148 Furthermore,
Congress can validly regulate the president’s official duties to prohibit actions motivated by corrupt intent to obstruct justice consistent with the president’s Article II power because Congress can validly make obstruction statutes applicable to corruptly motivated Presidential official acts without
impermissibly undermining his Article II functions.149 Indeed, the Report
concluded that protection of the criminal justice system from any person’s
corrupt acts–including the president–accords with the fundamental principle
of our government that “no person in this country is so high that he is above
the law.”150
VII. The Report’s Decision Not to Prosecute
The Report adopted the DOJ’s position that a sitting president cannot be indicted for obstruction of justice and because of this, declined against
143. Id. at pp. 7–8, 159.
144. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 8.
145. Id.
146. Id. at vol. 2, p. 8
147. Id. at pp. 7, 168.
148. Id.
149. Id. at vol. 2, p. 169.
150. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 180–81 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 (1882)).
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making a prosecutorial judgment.151 The Report, however, rejected the President’s lawyers claims that the President has Article II authority to obstruct
official proceedings consistent with separation of powers.152 However,
“while the [Report] does not conclude that the President committed a crime,
it also does not exonerate him.”153 Because the Report concludes that though
Trump cannot be criminally prosecuted while in office, it strongly states that
he is not immune from accountability by leaving open impeachment and removal as an option available to Congress followed by a subsequent criminal
prosecution.154 The Report concludes that one of its purposes is to conduct
a thorough factual investigation and preserve evidence while memories are
fresh and documentary materials are still available, to facilitate a potential
prosecution of the President upon his departure from office.155
Looking at the President’s actions outlined above, the Special Counsel “determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further
investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the President.”156 The former President refused to provide written answers regarding
obstruction of justice matters to the Special Counsel, and notwithstanding
the fact that the Special Counsel believed there was constitutional authority
to compel the President’s testimony regarding obstruction of justice via
grand jury subpoena, Mueller chose not to do so.157 Mueller cited to “the
substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at
[such] a late stage of [the] investigation,” and the significant body of evidence that was already obtained from the President’s actions and his public
and private statements describing or explaining those actions, including his
manifest concern that the intelligence community’s assessment of Russian
election interference on his behalf jeopardized the legitimacy of his presidency.158 The Report, moreover, made a point of not exonerating the President, stating that the Special Counsel was prepared to exonerate the President
but could not.159
This inability to exonerate the President stems from the many instances of obstruction of justice outlined above. The Report, however, did
not state that the President engaged in criminal conduct because such a statement would be, according to Mueller, improper and conflict with the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at p. 8.
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President’s immunity from criminal prosecution while in office.160 There are
four key points regarding Mueller’s reticence.
First, because the OLC made a legal conclusion that a sitting president cannot be indicted, as this would impermissibly undermine the Executive Branch’s capacity to perform its constitutionally assigned functions, the
Special Counsel declined to make a prosecutorial recommendation. In the
Report, Mueller states, “we recognized that a federal criminal accusation
against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity
to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes . . . .”161
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes a sitting president cannot
be prosecuted, it facilitates accountability and the rule of law by allowing for
a criminal investigation during the president’s term of office, such that executive officials other than the president can be criminally prosecuted for obstruction offenses during the president’s term, subject, of course, to the president’s pardon power.162 It also facilitates the proper collection of evidence
to ensure accountability. This is why the Report set forth that “[G]iven these
considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories
were fresh and documentary materials were available.”163
Third, Mueller decided not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a conclusion that the President engaged in behavior that “constitutes a federal offense.”164 Mueller decided against reaching such a conclusion because the ordinary means for a person to respond to a criminal
accusation, namely, a speedy public trial, with all the procedural protections
attendant to a criminal case, are unavailable to a sitting president, i.e. a “prosecutor’s judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be
brought, affords no such adversarial opportunity for a public name-clearing
before an impartial adjudicator.”165 This, in turn, also precluded the use of
an internal document such as a sealed indictment because it “could carry
consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice” and could
imperil a president’s ability to govern.166 Moreover, although a prosecutor’s
internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an indictment, the possibility of its public disclosure and the absence of a neutral
160.
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adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining that the President’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.167
Fourth, the Special Counsel set forth that if he had confidence that
the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, “we would so
state.”168 Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however,
“we are unable to reach that judgment.”169
VIII. What the Report Might Have, But Did Not State
The Report adopted the OLC’s conclusion that a sitting President
cannot be criminally prosecuted during his term of office such that the remedies to presidential criminality are: (1) impeachment in the House followed
by trial and conviction by the Senate; (2) the president’s loss of reelection
based on public revulsion by his behavior, and potentially; (3) criminal prosecution of the president upon his departure from office. Far from exonerating the President, however, the Report reads like a depressing indictment of
a temperamental mafia boss with no understanding of the American system
of government or the rule of law. Mueller’s refusal to describe the former
President’s actions as criminal enabled Barr to publicly mischaracterize the
Report, such that Trump and his supporters were subsequently able to effectively characterize the Report as a complete exoneration and as the “Russia
hoax.” As evidenced by the Senate’s decision to acquit the former President
of the abuse of power charges brought by the House regarding his repeated
attempts to coerce the Government of Ukraine to open a criminal investigation into his political rival, the Report’s failure to elicit the proper response
in the political culture has led to a framework whereby the majority of Republican voters see the President as unfairly persecuted and innocent. This,
in turn, worsens the problem of presidential impunity by, to paraphrase
Émile Durkheim, further defining deviancy downward.
Presidential impunity in this case, however, required an unprincipled
and partisan former Attorney General who was willing to exploit the Special
Counsel’s exceeding caution and reticence to mislead the public, and thereby
politically strengthen his boss. This was facilitated by a defect in the Special
Counsel Regulations that required Mueller to confidentially submit his report
to Barr, while entitling the former Attorney General to submit an unverifiable letter synopsis of the Report’s conclusions to Congress without, at the
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same time, disclosing the full Report.170 As set forth more fully below, Barr
masterfully exploited this defect for maximum political effect.
IX. Attorney General Barr’s Executive Summary and Subsequent
Characterization of the Report
The DOJ Special Counsel Regulations provide that a Special Counsel “shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential report explaining
the prosecution or declination decisions reached by the Special Counsel.”171
The Attorney General, in turn, “will notify the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committees of each House of Congress, with an explanation for each action [u]pon conclusion of the Special Counsel[’]s investigation . . . .”172 In short, the Special Counsel Regulations, interposed as they
were without notice and comment feedback, entitled Barr to keep the Report
secret and provide Congress with an unrebuttable synopsis of its conclusions.
He did this via letter dated March 22, 2019 to Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Graham, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Nadler, Senate
Judiciary Ranking Member Feinstein, and House Judiciary Committee
Ranking Member Collins and the March 24 Letter. The March 22, 2019
letter advised Congress that Special Counsel Mueller had concluded his investigation and had submitted to him a “confidential report explaining the
prosecution or declination decisions he ha[d] reached, as required by 28
C.F.R. 600.8 (c).”173 It concluded by stating that “I may be in a position to
advise you of the Special Counsel’s principal conclusions as soon as this
weekend.”174 The March 24, 2019 letter (“March 24 Letter”) set forth the
following:
1.

“The Special Counsel’s investigation did not find that the Trump
Campaign or anyone associated with it conspired or coordinated
with Russia in its efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election.”175
2. “The Special Counsel concluded that Russian government actors
successfully hacked into computers and obtained emails from
170. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (1999) provides that the Special Counsel’s report is to be confidentially
provided to the Attorney General without any limitation as to how the Attorney General can use or
characterize such report.
171. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8.
172. 28 C.F.R. § 600.9.
173. William Barr’s Letter to Congress on the Mueller Report, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/us/politics/barr-letter-mueller.html.
174. Id.
175. March 24 Letter, supra note 9.
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persons affiliated with the Clinton campaign and Democratic Party
organizations, and publicly disseminated those materials through
various intermediaries, including WikiLeaks.”176
With respect to the crime of Obstruction of Justice, after making a
thorough factual investigation, the Special Counsel chose not to
make a traditional prosecutorial judgment regarding the President’s
activities, and “therefore did not draw a conclusion–one way or the
other—as to whether the examined conduct constituted obstruction.”177
“The Special Counsel’s decision to describe the facts of his obstruction investigation without reaching any legal conclusions leaves it to
the Attorney General to determine whether the conduct described in
the report constitutes a crime.”178
Both Barr and Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein “concluded that
the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation
is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense,” and that, “while not determinative, the absence of such evidence bears upon President Trump’s intent with
respect to obstruction.”179 “Our determination was made without regard to, and is not based on, the constitutional considerations that
surround the indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting president.”180
This, in turn, is based on the Report’s conclusion that the “President
was not involved in an underlying crime with respect to Russian
election interference,” and “the absence of such evidence bears upon
the President’s intent with respect to obstruction.”181
The Report “identifies no actions that, in our judgment, constitute
obstructive conduct, had a nexus to a pending or contemplated proceeding, and were done with corrupt intent . . . .”182
Barr intended to “move forward expeditiously in determining” what
information in the Report “can be released in light of applicable law,
regulations and Departmental policies.”183

Id.
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9. That public release of the notification letter, per 28 C.F.R. Section
600.9 (c), is in the public interest and will be disclosed to the public.184
On March 27, 2019, Special Counsel Mueller, in a letter to Barr, set
forth that the representations made in the March 24 Letter “did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance of the Special Counsel’s Office’s
work and conclusions.”185 According to Mueller, the March 24 Letter sowed
“public confusion about critical aspects of the results of his investigation,”
which, Mueller noted “threatened to undermine a central purpose for which
the Department appointed Special Counsel Mueller: to assure full public
confidence in the outcome of the investigations.”186
On March 29, 2019, Barr, in a letter addressed to Chairmen Graham
and Nadler, represented that “some media reports and other public statements mischaracterized [his] March 24, 2019 [letter] as a ‘summary’ of the
Special Counsel’s investigation and the report.”187 It also stated that his
March 24 Letter “was not, and did not purport to be, an exhaustive recounting of Special Counsel’s investigation or report.”188 The letter stated that
everyone “will soon be able to read [the Report] on their own.”189
Prior to disclosing the Report, Barr held a press conference on April
18, 2019 and stated that Special Counsel Mueller’s “investigation did not
establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated
with the Russian government in its election interference activities.”190 Barr
said that, “we now know that the Russian operatives who perpetrated these
schemes did not have the cooperation of President Trump or the Trump campaign—or the knowing assistance of any other Americans for that matter.”191
Barr stated that the “bottom line” is that “after nearly two years of investigation, thousands of subpoenas, and hundreds of warrants and witness interviews,” Mueller did not find that the “Trump campaign or other Americans
184. Id.
185. See Jason Breslow, Mueller’s Letter Expressing Concern About Barr’s Summary of His
Report, NPR (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/01/719004457/read-muellers-letterexpressing-concern-about-barr-s-summary-of-his-report.
186. Breslow, supra note 185.
187. Letter from William Barr, U.S. Attorney General, to Senator Lindsey Graham and Representative Jerrold Nadler, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1153021/download [hereinafter March 29 Letter].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Barr’s News Conference Remarks Ahead of the Mueller Report Release, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/politics/barr-conference-transcript.html
[hereinafter Barr’s News Conference].
191. Id.

PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT

566

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:4

colluded” in Russian government sponsored efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election.192 Finally, Barr announced that he and Rosenstein
“concluded that the evidence developed by Special Counsel Mueller is not
sufficient to establish that President Trump committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.”193 He declared that[i]n assessing President Trump’s actions… it is important to
bear in mind the context. President Trump faced an unprecedented situation. As he entered into office, and sought to
perform his responsibilities as president, federal agents and
prosecutors were scrutinizing his conduct before and after
taking office, and the conduct of some of his associates. At
the same time, there was relentless speculation in the news
media about the President’s personal culpability. Yet, as he
said from the beginning, there was in fact no collusion. And
as [the Report] acknowledges, there is substantial evidence
to show that President Trump was frustrated and angered by
a sincere belief that the investigation was undermining his
presidency, propelled by his political opponents, and fueled
by illegal leaks. Nonetheless, the White House fully cooperated with Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation, providing unfettered access to campaign and White House documents, directing senior aides to testify freely, and asserting
no privilege claims. And at the same time, President Trump
took no act that in fact deprived Special Counsel Mueller of
the documents and witnesses necessary to complete his investigation. Apart from whether the acts were obstructive,
this evidence of non-corrupt motives weighs heavily against
any allegation that President Trump had a corrupt intent to
obstruct the investigation.194
That same day, Barr also released a letter to members of Congress
purporting to summarize the Report’s conclusions (“April 18 Letter”).195
The April 18 Letter set forth that Special Counsel Mueller’s “bottom line
conclusion on the question of so-called collusion was that the investigation
did not establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.196
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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It also stated that in light of Mueller’s “decision not to reach a conclusion on
whether President Trump obstructed justice,” the evidence set forth in the
Report was not sufficient to establish that President Trump committed an
obstruction-of-justice offense.”197
Barr’s misleading and highly partisan statements were all that were
made public between Mueller’s March 22, 2019 confidential filing of the
Report and April 19, 2019, when the redacted Report was finally made public. Barr’s characterizations of the Report have proved determinative.
Barr systematically misled Congress and the public in numerous
ways. First, he elided over the fact that the Russian Government deliberately
sought to assist the Trump candidacy and undermine the Clinton Campaign.198 Although Mueller found no proof that candidate Trump conspired
with Russia to alter the election outcome, the Report did mention, on several
occasions, that candidate Trump and his Campaign officials were more than
willing to receive campaign assistance from Russia that may well explain the
President’s subsequent attempts to undermine the Special Counsel investigation.199 Indeed, what both the Report and Barr’s letters fail to state is that
a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and the Russian Government
would have been both unnecessary and unhelpful from the Russian Government’s perspective because only Russia and not the Trump Campaign had
the expertise to alter the election campaign using social media disinformation and computer hacking and evidence of a conspiracy with Trump or
his campaign would only have harmed Russia’s interests regardless of who
won the election.
Second, the March 24 Letter and the April 18 Letter state that the
Report chose not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. Though true
in the strictest sense, it completely omitted the reason, namely that per the
DOJ guidelines as outlined in the OLC memo, a sitting president is immune
from criminal prosecution and it would be accordingly unfair to publicly
make a prosecutorial judgment against a president unable to clear his name
via a speedy adjudication.200 Indeed, both the March 24 Letter and the April
18 Letter systematically omitted the Report’s detailed itemization of Presidential obstructive conduct that would merit obstruction charges.201 The Report’s detailed listing of presidential misbehavior, its conclusion that the
President cannot be exonerated on an obstruction charge, and its conclusion
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
57.
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that it preserved testimony and evidence for a potential prosecution of the
President upon his departure from office, shows Mueller clearly felt that the
President engaged in criminal conduct but prudentially could not say so in
view of presidential immunity.202 While both letters correctly state that
Mueller chose not the make a prosecution recommendation, Barr falsely implied that this was because Mueller did not find sufficient evidence of presidential wrongdoing and incorrectly stated that it was left to Barr to determine
whether the President committed a crime.203
Third, both the March 24 and April 18 Letters state that the evidence
in the Report is insufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction offense. This statement is, of course, belied by the Report’s exhaustive listing of presidential obstruction.204
Fourth, both the March 24 Letter and the April 18 Letter incorrectly
state that the lack of proof of an illegal conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and the Russian Government supports a conclusion that the President
did not have a reason to commit an obstruction offense.205 This statement,
which appears nowhere in the Report, is contradicted by the fact the Report
concluded the President may have feared that the Special Counsel investigation would reveal such a conspiracy and that evidence of Russian assistance
to him and his campaign would undermine his legitimacy in office.206
Fifth, both letters incorrectly state that the Special Counsel “identifies no actions that, in our judgment, constitute obstructive conduct, had a
nexus to a pending or contemplated proceeding, and were done with corrupt
intent . . . .”207 This statement is definitively contradicted by the Report,
which demonstrates that the President engaged in obstructive conduct to undermine actual or contemplated criminal proceedings involving former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, former Trump Campaign Manager
Paul Manafort, and Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen.208
The March 24 Letter, the April 18 Letter, Barr’s testimony before
Congress, and his subsequent press conference misled both Congress and the
public as to the Report’s findings, and created unrebuttable narrative, for almost an entire month, that the Special Counsel declined to recommend prosecution based on a lack of evidence of presidential misbehavior. This was
untrue and clearly contradicted by the eventually disclosed Report. However,
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for a full month, the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations precluded Mueller
and members of his team from publicly disputing Barr’s public statements.209
United States District Court Judge Reggie Walton, no less, concluded that he had “grave concerns about the objectivity of the process that
preceded the public release of the redacted version of [the Report] and its
impact on the DOJ’s subsequent justifications that its redactions of the Report are authorized by the [Freedom of Information Act]” in adjudicating a
suit seeking disclosure of the full unredacted Report brought by public interest and media plaintiffs.210 In particular, Judge Walton’s decision denying
DOJ summary judgment on the FOIA issue, set forth that he concurred with
Mueller’s assessment, set forth in Mueller’s March 27 Letter to Barr, that the
March 24 Letter “did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance of
the Special Counsel’s Office’s work and conclusions.”211 Judge Walton’s
decision set forth that “a review of the redacted version of [the Report] by
the Court results in the Court’s concurrence with Special Counsel Mueller’s
assessment that Attorney General Barr distorted the findings in [the Report].”212 According to Judge Walton, Barr’s summary:
failed to indicate that Special Counsel Mueller identified
multiple contacts—‘links,’ in the words of the Appointment
Order—between Trump [c]ampaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government,’ . . . and that Special
Counsel Mueller only concluded that the investigation did
not establish that ‘these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump [c]ampaign and
Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the [Trump] [c]ampaign in exchange for any sort of
favorable treatment in the future,’ because coordination—
the term that appears in the Appointment Order—'does not
have a settled definition in federal criminal law,’ (internal
citations and parentheses omitted).213
Judge Walton concluded that although Barr can be “commended for
his effort to expeditiously release a summary of Special Counsel Mueller’s
principal conclusions in the public interest, “the Court is troubled by his
209. See 28 C.F.R § 600.8 (requiring that the Special Counsel report be filed confidentially
with the Attorney General).
210. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, F. Supp.3d (D.C. Cir. 2020).
211. Elec. Privacy Info., F. Supp.3d at 5.
212. Id. at 16.
213. Id. at 16–17.
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hurried release of [the March 24 Letter] well in advance of when the redacted
version of [the Report] was ultimately made available to the public.”214
Judge Walton writes:
[t]he speech by which Attorney General released to the public the summary of Special Counsel Mueller’s principal conclusions, coupled with the fact that Attorney General Barr
failed to provide a thorough representation of the findings
set forth in [the Report], causes the Court to question
whether Attorney General Barr’s intent was to create a onesided narrative about [the Report]—a narrative that is
clearly in some respects substantively at odds with the redacted version of [the Report].215
Judge Walton further concluded that Barr’s decision to not only conduct a
press conference but also issue the April 18 Letter immediately prior to releasing the redacted version of the Report to the public “also causes the Court
concern.”216 This is because Barr’s representations made during his April
18, 2019 press conference and letter cannot be reconciled with the Report’s
findings.217 This caused Judge Walton to “seriously question whether Attorney General Barr made a calculated attempt to influence public discourse
about the Report “in favor of President Trump despite certain findings in the
redacted version of the Report to the contrary.”218
Judge Walton is undoubtedly correct. Barr’s dishonest March 24
Letter ended up having a dispositive effect because by the time the fully redacted Report was released nearly a full month later, the political culture had
already been misled into believing that Mueller chose not to make a prosecutorial recommendation based on a lack of evidence. This explains
Mueller’s March 27 Letter to Barr disputing characterization of the Special
Counsel’s report as failing “to capture the context, nature and substance” of
the Russia investigation.219 Mueller’s letter set forth that Barr’s summary of
the Report improperly framed the Report’s findings which created “public
confusion about critical aspects of the results of our investigation” that
“threaten[ed] to undermine a central purpose for which the Department appointed the Special Counsel: to assure full public confidence in the outcome
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of the investigations.”220 To protect against this, Mueller recommended that
the Report’s executive summaries be immediately made public because such
disclosure would “alleviate the misunderstandings that have arisen and
would answer congressional and public questions about the nature and outcome of our investigation,” and would, per Barr’s letter to Congress, “be in
the public interest.”221 Barr, however, failed to act on this request and instead
allowed his letter’s misleading characterization of the Report’s findings to
adumbrate the President’s claim of exoneration.
An April 3, 2019 New York Times article set forth that members of
the Special Counsel’s team were concerned that Barr’s incorrect first narrative of the Special Counsel’s findings “will have hardened” Americans’
views “before the investigation’s conclusions become public.”222 Indeed,
President Trump, no less, claimed “complete and total exoneration” based
on the Barr letter and went so far as to call on “the Justice Department and
his allies on Capitol Hill to investigate and hold accountable those responsible for opening the inquiry.”223
Because the Barr letter was so misleading and Mueller and his team
were bound by Justice Department confidentiality, Barr was able to solidify
his incorrect claim of no obstruction by the President and undermine the political impact of the redacted Report when it was eventually made public.224
As U.S. Senator Chris Coons put it to Barr, “A critical three weeks passed
between when you delivered [the March 24 Letter] with the focus on the
principal conclusions and when we ultimately got the redacted report . . . My
concern is that gave President Trump and his folks more than three weeks of
an open field to say, ‘I was completely exonerated.’”225
Barr effectively defanged a damning Report that reads like a criminal indictment, or under these circumstances, an impeachment referral to
Congress, by misleading Congress and the public as to the Report’s conclusions and delaying the Report’s public release to mute its political effect.226
This is because Congress, the press, and the public accepted the March 24
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Letter as an authoritative synopsis of the Report’s conclusions.227 To illustrate, upon reviewing the March 24 Letter, House Speaker Pelosi said “I’m
not for impeachment . . . Unless there is something so compelling and overwhelming and bipartisan, I don’t think we should go down that path, because
it divides the country.”228 Highly regarded liberal media personalities accepted Barr’s characterization of the Report.229 National Public Radio’s Domenico Montanaro wrote:
There’s nothing in [the Report], according to the Barr letter,
that meets those thresholds. If there was “something so
compelling and overwhelming,” Barr would almost certainly have had to have written about it. At best, Democrats
will pull at the obstruction string, hoping for evidence in a
fuller version of [the Report] or underlying documents that
help make that case.230
Montanaro went further to add that the March 24 Letter gave momentum to the President and his supporters’ claim of “no collusion” with
Russia and enabled the President to characterize the Russia Investigation as
“an illegal takedown that failed” and on Twitter, a “total
EXONERATION.”231
Republicans in Congress did not equivocate in their support for
Trump. An early Republican critic of the President, Senator Lindsey Graham, after reviewing the Barr letter, tweeted on the day of the letter’s release
that it was a “[G]ood day for the rule of law, Great day for President Trump
and his team, No collusion or obstruction, The Cloud hanging over President
Trump has been removed by this report.”232 Two things are manifested from
Senator Graham’s tweet. First, he reads the Barr letter as a vindication of
the President when even the letter clearly stated that the Special Counsel refused to exonerate the President of obstruction. Second, Graham did not
distinguish the March 24 Letter from the Report that, at the time, remained
unavailable.233 It evidences that Senator Graham, a very powerful and highly
influential member of the U.S. Senate, was effectively misled by the March
24 Letter into publicly adopting an exoneration narrative. This, in turn,
227. Domenico Montanaro, Impeachment Just Got Less Likely and 6 Other Takeaways from
the Barr Letter, NPR (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/25/706432776/impeachmentjust-got-less-likely-and-6-other-takeaways-from-the-barr-letter.
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dispositively prejudiced his view of the full Report when it was eventually
released. Senator Graham’s tweets are paradigmatic with respect to the Republican Congressional caucus. Subsequent calls for the President’s impeachment based on the Report were thereafter made solely by the most partisan Democrats and did not include either Speaker Pelosi or members of her
leadership team.234
Barr facilitated the former President and his supporters’ ability to
characterize the Report as an exoneration and the Russia Investigation itself
as a partisan “witch hunt.”235 Problematically, it furthered the problem of
presidential impunity by emboldening the President’s reckless instincts by
furthering a narrative that the President has been unfairly investigated by his
“deep state” and partisan opponents.236 The Reverend Franklin Graham
called the President’s impeachment “an unjust inquisition”237 and suggested
it was the work of a “demonic power.”238 Liberty University President Jerry
Falwell, Jr. argued that Trump’s term of office should be extended by two
years based on the “failed coup” against him.239 Others, including the entirety of the Republican House caucus and nearly the entire Republican Senate caucus, have fallen into line fearing for their own political survival.240
The March 24 Letter not only prevented the Report from eliciting a
timely impeachment but facilitated presidential impunity and subsequent
abuses of power by enabling the President and his supporters to
234. Stephen Collinson, Pelosi Resists Calls for Impeachment after Mueller Refuses to Exonerate Trump, CNN (May 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/30/politics/donald-trump-robert-mueller-nancy-pelosi-impeachment/index.html.
235. Olivia Paschal and Madeleine Carlisle, 14 Must-Read Moments from the Mueller Report,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/04/mueller-report-release-barr-trump/587176/.
236. See David Faris, The Impeachment Hearings Have Demolished Trump’s Deep State Defense, THE WEEK (Nov. 20, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/879457/impeachment-hearingshave-demolished-trumps-deep-state-defense.
237. Benjamin Fearnow, Evangelist Franklin Graham Urges Prayers for Donald Trump by
Promoting T-Shirt, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/pray-45-donaldtrump-t-shirt-franklin-graham-advertisement-christians-prayer-abortion-1469377.
238. Peter Wehner, Are Trump’s Critics Demonically Possessed?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 25,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/to-trumps-evangelicals-everyone-elseis-a-sinner/602569/.
239. Owen Daugherty, Trump Retweets Jerry Falwell Jr. Suggesting His Term Should Be Extended by Two Years, THE HILL (May 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/442222-trump-retweets-jerry-falwell-jr-suggesting-his-term-should-be-extended.
240. See Sherrod Brown, In Private Republicans Admit They Acquitted Trump out of Fear,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020); https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/opinion/trump-senate-acquittalimpeachment.html (notwithstanding clear proof of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress,
none of the 197 Republicans in the House of Representatives voted to impeach the President and
fifty-two of fifty-three Senate Republicans voted to acquit the President after having voted not to
take witness testimony regarding his alleged abuse of power).
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mischaracterize the Russia Investigation as a “witch hunt” and incorrectly
claim the Report completely exonerated the President of any wrongdoing. It
also, tragically, furthered presidential impunity by facilitating the former
President’s narrative that his political opponents, rather than legitimately being opposed to presidential abuse of power, were merely loath to accept his
legitimacy in office and obsessed with his removal. This narrative largely
explains why the President’s impeachment in the Ukraine matter did not gain
political traction with Republicans in either the House or the Senate, e.g. all
197 Republicans in the House voted against impeaching the President and
fifty-two out of fifty-three Senate Republicans vote to acquit after refusing
to call any witnesses into Presidential abuse of power.241 It also explains
why many of the President’s supporters, including the majority of Republican voters nationwide, sided with Trump when he incorrectly and dishonestly claimed the 2020 presidential election was stolen from him.242
X. Back to the Special Counsel Regulations
All of this was tragically facilitated by a defect in the Special Counsel Regulations that was neither seen nor anticipated when implemented
without notice and comment in 1999, namely, that a sitting Attorney General
would use the text of the Regulations to issue an incorrect report summary
to effectively cover-up detailed evidence of presidential abuse of power and
obstruction of justice. The DOJ’s failure to subject the Special Counsel Regulations to notice and comment resulted in the final Regulations being premised on the supposition that the Attorney General would be a relatively nonpartisan such as Elliott Richardson or Janet Reno. This was a naïve supposition that overlooked the partisan attorneys general of the past and failed to
anticipate the political hyperpolarization of today. The concern about an improper political manipulation of the Special Counsel Regulations would have
been evidenced were they to have been subjected to notice and comment
under APA 553 because that is what notice-and-comment is designed to do.
Submission of the Regulations for public comment would have brought forth
public commentary from all components of civil society and ferreted out the
defect while the Regulations were tentative such that their concerns could
241. Senator Susan Collins broke ranks and was the first to republican to announce support to
call witnesses. Paul LeBlanc, Susan Collins becomes first Republican Senator to Say Yes to Witnesses in Impeachment Trial, CNN (Jan. 30, 2020, Updated 11:45PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/30/politics/susan-collins-impeachment-witnesses/index.html.
242. Jay Zilinsky et al., Which Republicans are Most Likely to Think the Election was Stolen?
Those Who Dislike Democrats and Don’t Mind White Nationalists, Washington Post (Jan. 19,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/19/which-republicans-think-electionwas-stolen-those-who-hate-democrats-dont-mind-white-nationalists/.
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have been addressed in the final Regulations. In the end, the failure to subject the Special Counsel Regulations to notice-and-comment has resulted in
a Special Counsel paradigm that not only fails to protect against presidential
abuse of power, but actually facilitates abuse of power and presidential impunity in office by enabling a partisan attorney general to mischaracterize a
special counsel report while keeping it confidential consistent with the Special Counsel Regulations.
Now that President Trump has departed from office, the Special
Counsel Regulations should be submitted for notice and comment feedback
by legal experts and the broader public. At a minimum, the comments will
recommend that the Regulations should no longer allow an attorney general
to issue a Special Counsel report summary without disclosing the entire redacted document to Congress and the public. The comments may also recommend allowing the Special Counsel to speak to the media and testify before Congress during the Special Counsel’s investigation to protect the
investigation’s integrity. Recognizing the inordinately high threshold
needed in the Senate to convict an impeached President, the current framework to ensure against presidential abuses of power is not working. I, therefore, recommend this simple improvement: subjecting the Special Counsel
Regulations to notice-and-comment under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
Conclusion
Special Counsel Mueller did an outstanding job at arriving at the
truth with respect to Russian election interference in the 2016 presidential
election. However, based on his limited brief and his concern to maintain
the proper separation of powers, the Report abjured a determination as to
whether the former President committed crimes when he, on several occasions, sought to scupper the investigation. This decision to abjure a finding
of criminality gave former Attorney General Barr the opportunity to mislead
Congress and the public as to the Report’s conclusions, and this month-long
head start was determinative. Problematically, the lack of political response
to the Report’s findings emboldened the President’s recklessness and furthered his instinctive authoritarianism and contempt for the rule of law. The
paradigmatic explanations for this problem of presidential impunity include
the hyper-partisanship that characterizes today’s Washington and the
broader political culture, as well as profit-driven partisan media that furthers
the nation’s partisan divide. These explanations, though correct, are not sufficient.
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Presidential impunity in this administration is also attributable to infirmities in the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations that might have been ferreted out if they were submitted for notice and comment feedback when first
implemented by former Attorney General Reno in 1999. For reasons of political expediency, they have never since been revisited. This must change.
Special Counsel Regulations which require Special Counsel to submit their
reports confidentially to the Attorney General, while the Attorney General
can, in turn, submit unverifiable synopses of report conclusions to Congress,
leave too much room for abuse—especially in today’s political climate. This
is what undermined the Report’s effectiveness and furthered the narrative of
an illegitimate, systemic and partisan-driven “witch hunt” against the President.
I recommend submitting the Special Counsel Regulations for notice
and comment review under APA Section 553 to solicit feedback from experts and the public as to how the Special Counsel Regulations can be improved consistent with the President’s powers under Article II of the U.S.
Constitution. At a minimum, I would expect that the received public comment will recommend future Attorneys General be disallowed from disclosing synopses or summaries of Special Counsel reports without simultaneously disclosing the entire redacted document. If this requirement had been
in place at the time when the Report was submitted to former Attorney General Barr, President Trump would either have been removed from office, or,
chastened by near conviction in the Senate after impeachment in the House;
the country would not be facing the current dystopia whereby Trump, who
was impeached and tried twice, who sought to undermine the rule of law,
who abused his powers of office to blackmail a friendly foreign government
and who even attempt to illegally remain in power by undermining the peaceful transition of power, remains, by far, the most popular Republican politician in the country.

